This paper addresses the question of who should be trusted as an expert and when, particularly in the context of public deliberation. Trust in experts is crucial in making decisions about public policies that involve complex information beyond the expertise of most people. However, fruitful deliberation also requires being able to resist misinformation campaigns, no matter how widespread these might be; being able, in general, to evaluate the evidence at our disposal and form our own opinions. The purpose of this (...) paper is to reflect on this apparent tension between epistemic deference and epistemic independence. The paper has two goals. First, it aims at providing a more nuanced understanding of the question of who should be trusted as an expert by examining cases in which seemingly factual claims are made in public settings by experts. Second, it emphasizes the need to pay attention to the conditions under which we actually trust each other. We suggest that fostering trust in science may be better approached by modifying the conditions under which scientific dialogue takes place, rather than trying to convince the public to trust experts, or blaming them for not doing so. (shrink)

Las consideraciones del filósofo Herbert Paul Grice en el campo de la pragmática marcaron un punto de inflexión en la historia de la filosofía. Ellas siguen siendo de enorme utilidad, y la interpretación de sus escritos está abierta a discusión. Sin embargo, el análisis de Grice en términos de las intenciones de los hablantes ha dado pie a que se interprete su programa como una postura compatible con el naturalismo de la intencionalidad. Sin embargo, esta interpretación tiene serios problemas. En (...) el presente trabajo presentaremos la posición de Grice y la interpretación naturalista de su diagnóstico, señalaremos las objeciones a esta última desde el expresivismo clásico, y defenderemos que puede hacerse una interpretación de Grice más consistente con su pensamiento y capaz de esquivar las críticas del expresivismo. (shrink)

The aim of this work is to comment and discuss some central ideas of Tim Crane’s book The Object of Thought (2013). In particular, I pose an objection for the reductionist solution to the problem of non-existence offered by the author. Tim Crane defends that the truth of sentences that contain terms referring to non-existent objects (like 'Pegasus') can be explained by appealing to the truth of sentences about things that do exist (Pegasus’ representation in the myth). I argue that (...) this explanation does not work for sentences used in a normative or evaluative way. (shrink)